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ABSTRACT 
The seemingly stable construct of our bodily self depends 
on the continued, successful integration of multisensory feedback 
about our body, rather than its purely physical composition. 
Accordingly, pathological disruption of such neural processing is 
linked to striking alterations of the bodily self, ranging from limb 
misidentification to disownership, and even the desire to amputate 
a healthy limb. While previous embodiment research has relied on 
experimental setups using supernumerary limbs in variants of the 
Rubber Hand Illusion, we here used Augmented Reality to directly 
manipulate the feeling of ownership for one’s own, biological limb. 
Using a Head-Mounted Display, participants received visual 
feedback about their own arm, from an embodied first-person 
perspective. In a series of three studies, in independent cohorts, we 
altered embodiment by providing visuotactile feedback that could 
be synchronous (control condition) or asynchronous (400ms delay, 
Real Hand Illusion). During the illusion, participants reported a 
significant decrease in ownership of their own limb, along with a 
lowered sense of agency. Supporting the right-parietal body 
network, we found an increased illusion strength for the left upper 
limb as well as a modulation of the feeling of ownership during 
anodal transcranial direct current stimulation. Extending previous 
research, these findings demonstrate that a controlled, visuotactile 
conflict about one’s own limb can be used to directly and 
systematically modulate ownership – without a proxy. This not 
only corroborates the malleability of body representation but 
questions its permanence. These findings warrant further 
exploration of combined VR and neuromodulation therapies for 
disorders of the bodily self.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The foundations of our “selves”, and our understanding of who we are, are 
laid by the continuous and successful integration of multisensory 
information about our body. This interdependence between “mind” and body 
has occupied the thoughts of scholars time and again: from Descartes’ notion 
that the self cannot exist without the senses (Descartes & Cottingham, 2013), 
to Husserl positing that there is no possibility of distancing the self from the 
body or the body from the self (Husserl, 2002), to William James’ oft-cited 
claim that the body is “always there” (James, 1890). There is an 
overwhelming sense that the direct neural representation of our bodies, in 
harmony with our actual body composition, forms the basis of an infallible 
bodily self. However, clinical examples challenge this notion and have 
suggested that the body indeed can be experienced as lost, not under control, 
or not belonging (Brugger & Lenggenhager, 2014). This latter feeling of 
ownership is argued to be a key aspect of our sense of a bodily self (Blanke, 
2012). Yet, while psychological and neuroscientific research has extensively 
investigated the fundaments of the feeling of ownership for a foreign body 
part, the clinically presented loss of ownership has largely been neglected.  
Empirical insights into corporeal awareness stem to a large extent from 
experimental designs, which allow temporarily altering the sense of 
ownership through multisensory stimulation (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; H. 
H. Ehrsson, 2007; B. Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; 
Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). Most famously, Botvinick and Cohen induced 
illusory ownership of an artificial hand by stroking a rubber hand placed in 
front of the participant in synchrony with the participant’s real hidden hand 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). This phenomenological experience of 
ownership over the rubber hand is accompanied by objectively-measurable 
changes in a broad variety of processes ranging from basic physiological 
mechanisms (e.g., body temperature (Macauda et al., 2015; G. L. Moseley et 
al., 2008), nociception (Hansel, Lenggenhager, von Kanel, Curatolo, & 
Blanke, 2011; Romano, Pfeiffer, Maravita, & Blanke, 2014), cardiac 
signalling (Park et al., 2016), response to threat (H. Henrik Ehrsson, Wiech, 
Weiskopf, Dolan, & Passingham, 2007), and immunological responses 
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(Barnsley et al., 2011)) up to high-level cognition (see e.g. (Maister, Slater, 
Sanchez-Vives, & Tsakiris, 2015) for a recent review). Empirical data thus 
suggest that the bodily self is highly plastic and based upon momentary 
sensory integration.  
Next to our understanding of the nature of bodily self-consciousness and its 
disorders (Brugger & Lenggenhager, 2014), these data contribute towards 
developing methods to restore the bodily self where it is disturbed (G. L. 
Moseley, 2007; Pazzaglia, Haggard, Scivoletto, Molinari, & Lenggenhager, 
2016). Strikingly however, most studies using multisensory stimulation in 
healthy participants or patients targeted the manipulation to bodily 
ownership of an additional and external, fake or virtual body (part), or more 
recently, two virtual representations of one’s own limb (Newport & Preston, 
2011; Ratcliffe & Newport, 2017). In the above-described rubber hand 
illusion (RHI), the most striking phenomenological perception is not the 
feeling of disownership of the real hand but the feeling of ownership for the 
supernumerary rubber hand. In fact the two sensations are difficult to 
disentangle due to the nature of the RHI’s experimental design (Longo, 
Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008). This “positive” embodiment 
stands in clear contrast to the clinical cases of disturbance of body 
ownership. While illusory ownership for a foreign body part has been 
described initially in certain cases of Somatoparaphrenia (Gerstmann, 1942), 
such neurological patients generally present with an altered sense of 
ownership for the own biological body. For example, in the more typical 
case of Somatoparaphrenia, patients lose the feeling of ownership for their 
own hand (Bottini, Bisiach, Sterzi, & Vallar, 2002). Similarly, Xenomelia 
patients feel like parts of their biological body do not belong to them 
(McGeoch et al., 2011). Even in the case of more general disturbances of the 
bodily self, for example the depersonalization syndrome, the own biological 
body does often not feel like being “self” anymore (Sierra, Baker, Medford, 
& David, 2005).   
We here describe a new paradigm, the Real Hand Illusion (ReHI), designed 
to address this discrepancy between clinical reports and existing research 
paradigms in trying to alter the sense of ownership of one’s own biological 
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limb in an Augmented Reality setup. During the illusion, participants view 
their own hand directly and from a first-person perspective through a head-
mounted display (HMD) being touched either synchronously or 
asynchronously to the visual feedback (see Figure 1). The illusion was 
assessed with a questionnaire adapted from the classical RHI questionnaire 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 2008). As synchronous visuotactile 
stimulation has repeatedly been shown to increase perceived ownership, we 
predicted continued ownership during the synchronous stimulation and – 
more pertinent to the phenomenology described in clinical cases – decreased 
ownership of the own limb during the asynchronous condition. The latter 
could thus be regarded as temporarily mimicking the phenomenology found 
in Somatoparaphrenia or Xenomelia patients, i.e. the feeling of estrangement 
for their own limb.  
Both Somatoparaphrenia and Xenomelia have been suggested to relate to 
alterations in multisensory bodily areas in the predominantly right-
hemispheric posterior parietal areas (Hilti et al., 2013; McGeoch et al., 2011; 
Rode et al., 1992). As a consequence, both syndromes predominantly affect 
the left side of the body. In a second study, we thus investigated whether the 
feeling of disownership could be evoked more easily on the left as compared 
to the right hand in healthy participants. Based on previous literature on the 
rubber hand illusion which suggests stronger illusion for the left hand 
(Ocklenburg, Rüther, Peterburs, Pinnow, & Güntürkün, 2011), we 
hypothesized a stronger sensation of disownership during asynchronous 
stroking of the left as compared to the right hand.  
In line with the idea of a right posterior parietal contribution to disorders of 
body ownership, we further investigated whether neuromodulation of 
parietal areas might alter the illusion in a systematic way. Brain imaging 
studies in individuals with Xenomelia have reported altered neural processes 
in the superior and inferior parietal lobe (Hilti et al., 2013; McGeoch et al., 
2011; Oddo-Sommerfeld et al., 2018). Limb misidentification due to right-
hemispheric damage has also been associated with parietal areas (Antoniello 
& Gottesman, 2017; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). In line with this, 
neuromodulation through vestibular stimulation, which activates right 
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parieto-insular areas (C. Lopez, Blanke, & Mast, 2012), has been shown to 
be helpful in Somatoparaphrenia (Rode et al., 1992) and consecutively also 
suggested as a therapeutic approach for Xenomelia ((Ramachandran & 
McGeoch, 2007); but see also (Bigna Lenggenhager, Hilti, Palla, Macauda, 
& Brugger, 2014)). Similarly, left anodal galvanic vestibular stimulation has 
been used to manipulate bodily ownership in healthy participants in a rubber 
hand illusion setup (Christophe Lopez, Lenggenhager, & Blanke, 2010). In a 
further, exploratory study, we used transcranial brain stimulation rather than 
indirect peripheral stimulation to alter activation of right parietal areas. We 
applied anodal and cathodal tDCS over the right superior parietal lobe 
normalised by a baseline sham stimulation. In line with previous literature 
we expected stimulation of right parietal networks to modulate body 
ownership.   
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.1. Setup 
The technical setup follows the methods of our previous study (Bernal, 
Maes, & Kannape, 2016) as described in the following. A MacBook Pro 
Retina by Apple (Apple Inc., Cupertino, CA, USA), was used to render the 
visual feedback. The laptop had a dedicated AMD Radeon R9 M370X 
graphics card. The Oculus Rift DK2 (Subsidiary of Facebook, Menlo Park, 
CA, USA), Version 1.6 (SDK 0.5.0.1), was used to display the feedback. 
The HMD has a resolution of 960x1080pixels per eye, a horizontal field of 
view of 100°, and a refresh rate of 60Hz. Head orientation but not translation 
was tracked, as participants were asked to keep their head stationary during 
each trial. A LeapMotion controller (Leap Motion, Inc. San Francisco, CA, 
USA, Software Version 2.3.1) recorded the participant’s hand as well as the 
paintbrush, used to provide tactile feedback, using the integrated infra-red 
(IR) cameras. The visual stimuli used the resulting IR pass-through feed so 
that participants would see their own hand, as opposed to a rigged 3D model 
(cf. supplemental figure 1). Finally, the Unity game engine (Unity 
Technologies, San Francisco, CA, USA Version 5.1.3f) was used to render 
the stimuli in an otherwise empty virtual space.  
.CC-BY 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/349795doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jun. 20, 2018; 
  
7
 
Figure 1 – A. Participants are seated at a desk with their right arm resting on a pillow at 
their side. They wear the Head-Mounted Display with attached IR camera. The video feed 
of the camera is used to display the image of the participant’s own hand in the HMD. B. The 
biological and augmented limbs are aligned so that participants see their own hand in the 
correct anatomical position. In the control condition the feedback accurately presents the 
experimenter’s hand and the paintbrush providing synchronous (matching) visuotactile 
feedback. C. In the experimental condition, a 400ms delay is introduced in the visual 
feedback. Participants therefore feel the touch of the paintbrush (light grey) before seeing 
the paintbrush in the corresponding position.  
2.2. Synchronous and Asynchronous Feedback 
In order to change the delay of the visual feedback between the synchronous 
and asynchronous conditions, a buffer of the IR-feed was implemented using 
Leap’s Controller object within Unity. This maintains a frame history buffer 
of 60 frames. At 120fps sampling of the LeapMotion cameras, this provides 
up to half a second delay. Here, a 40-frame delay was used in order to 
produce a ~400ms delay during asynchronous feedback. This includes the 
intrinsic latency of the equipment which is as follows: tracking camera frame 
rate (120fps, ~8ms), tracking algorithm (4ms), display refresh rate (60Hz, 
~17ms), and GPU calculations (~17ms) totalling to an intrinsic system delay 
of ~46ms (Bernal et al., 2016). Feedback in the synchronous condition was 
therefore achieved in under 50ms. 
2.3. Tactile Feedback 
Tactile feedback was provided using an ordinary flat, short-haired paint 
brush (size 10). The experimenter stroked the dorsum of the participant’s 
hand and fingers in different positions and directions for a total of three 
minutes. Unlike in previous limb ownership studies, only the participant’s 
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hand was stroked, as opposed to an additional rubber hand. Accordingly, the 
visuo-tactile conflict in the asynchronous condition is purely temporal, and 
the visuo-tactile feedback in the synchronous condition exactly matches the 
actual stimulation. It should be noted that the experimental condition of the 
RHI, synchronous feedback, is in this case the control condition, Figure 1B; 
the asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, the control condition in the RHI, 
becomes the experimental condition, Figure 1C.  
In studies 2 and 3, but not study 1, the three-minute illusion was preceded by 
one minute of synchronous, visual only, feedback. Here, participants were 
asked to move their hands in order to familiarise themselves with the 
environment, get accustomed to the feedback, and appreciate that they have 
full control of their own arm in the VR space.  
2.4. ReHI Questionnaire 
Following each trial, participants were asked to write down any comments 
they had about their perception of the illusion (open feedback). 
Phenomenological aspects of the illusion were then systematically assessed 
with a questionnaire adapted from the classical RHI questionnaire (Botvinick 
& Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 2008). Questions one through six were scored 
positively from 0 to 10, whereas questions seven through ten pertain to the 
feeling of disownership and were therefore reverse-coded for the analysis (0 
-> 10, 1 ->9, etc.). This was done so that all ten questions were combined to 
calculate an overall illusion-score with a possible range of 0 to 100. A score 
of 100 represents the highest possible ‘embodiment score’, whereas a score 
of 0 would reflect a complete loss of ownership and agency of the seen hand. 
2.5. Participants 
Study 1 (N=20, age µ=21±1years, 12 female) investigated the illusion based 
on the individual questions and an overall score (see figure 2 for boxplots). 
A t-test comparing the illusion score between the two conditions of interest 
(i.e., synchronous versus asynchronous stroking) revealed a significant effect 
(t(19)=4.58, p<0.001, Cohen’s dz = 1.02) between conditions. This Cohen’s 
d was used for power calculations in studies 2 and 3. Participants for all 
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three studies were right-handed (self-reported) and had normal or corrected 
to normal vision. 
A power calculation (G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007)) 
indicated that a sample size of 15 would be required to detect an effect size 
of dz = 1.02, with the alpha level set at .05, with power of .95 (two-tailed). 
Twenty participants were recruited for study 2 (age: µ=21.55±2.48years, 10 
females).  
Power calculation for the exploratory neurostimulation study was further 
informed by Kammers and colleagues effect size of approximately d = 0.6, 
reported in their rTMS study on the RHI (Marjolein P. M. Kammers et al., 
2009). Using a paired samples t-test to contrast two stimulation conditions, 
to reach 80% power with this effect size (alpha level = .05) would require 24 
participants. Twenty-six participants (age µ=21.32±8.31years, 16 male) were 
recruited and completed the tDCS paradigm (study 3).  All participants 
refrained from consuming caffeine for at least three hours prior to the tDCS 
stimulation. All studies had been approved by the University of Central 
Lancashire’s Ethical committee (Protocol PSYSOC336).  
2.6. Transcranial direct current stimulation 
TDCS over the right SPL was used to change cortical excitability (see Figure 
3). In one condition, anodal stimulation was applied over the right SPL with 
the aim of increasing cortical excitability, with the cathodal electrode as the 
reference. In another condition, cathodal stimulation was applied over the 
right SPL with the aim of decreasing cortical excitability. The third 
condition was the sham stimulation condition, which acted as a baseline 
against which to compare active stimulation. Participants attended two 
separate sessions, separated by at least three days. Participants always 
completed the anodal and cathodal stimulation conditions in separate 
sessions, to avoid after-effects from one condition affecting another 
condition. Half the participants additionally completed the sham condition at 
the start of the first session, while the remaining half completed the sham 
condition at the start of the second session. The stimulation was applied 
double-blinded using pre-determined codes stored on the tDCS equipment, 
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which determined the type of stimulation applied (anodal, cathodal or sham) 
without the experimenter’s knowledge. 
The electrodes were positioned with the aid of an EASYCAP 21 EEG cap 
(EASYCAP, Herrsching), with the scalp electrode positioned over the P4 
region according to the international 10-20 system. The P4 electrode is 
located approximately over the right superior parietal lobe (Herwig, Satrapi, 
& Schönfeldt-Lecuona, 2003) and has previously been used to target this 
region (Ono, Mikami, Fukuyama, & Mima, 2016). The reference electrode 
was positioned over the ipsilateral shoulder, held in place with a rubber strap 
(cf. Figure 3).  
In the two tDCS conditions, participants received 1200s (including 8s of 
fade-in and 8s of fade-out) of tDCS, using a NeuroConn DC-Stimulator Plus 
(NeuroConn, Germany). A 1.5mA current was delivered through 25cm2 
saline-soaked sponges (0.9% NaCl solution), held in place on the 
participant’s scalp by rubber straps (current density of 0.06mA/cm2). 
Stimulation was applied for 600s before task onset, and continued 600s after 
task onset.   
Sham stimulation consisted of stimulation applied for 38s, before dropping 
to regular pulses of 115µA (lasting 3ms) every 550ms, which gives an 
average current strength of 0.002mA. This level of stimulation is far lower 
than required to cause changes in cortical excitability but allows monitoring 
of impedance (which could indicate poor electrode contact or 
disconnection). 
 
2.7. Analysis and Data Availability 
Paired frequentist and Bayesian t-tests were conducted in JASP (JASP 
Team, 2018). These tests were two-tailed for NHST and directional for 
calculation of BF due to clear directional hypothesis of the illusion effect. 
Significance thresholds were set to p<.05 and BF>3 (BF<.3) respectively. 
NHST was used in combination with power-calculations; Bayesian statistics 
(Dienes, 2014) are included as potential evidence in favour of the null. 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated in R using R-Studio (R Development Core 
Team, 2017) and the Psych package (Revelle, 2017). All data will be made 
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available to the readers via a public Open Science Framework project 
(http://osf.io/wbp59). 
Figure 2 – Questions and box plot with interquartile ranges of the results across the three studies – Questions 1 
through 6 were adapted from previous studies on the RHI. Question 4 is a control question and question 5 addresses 
participants’ sense of agency. Questions 7 through 10 were included to directly address disownership aspects of the 
ReHI. Participants in all three cohorts rated embodiment higher given synchronous visuotactile feedback about their 
upper limb in the control condition compared to the asynchronous feedback during the ReHI.  All asterisks indicate 
NHST significance. Data for S2 and S3 (sham stimulation) are taken from left hand.  
.CC-BY 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/349795doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jun. 20, 2018; 
  
12
3. RESULTS 
As this is a novel illusion, we first set out to investigate the effects of the 
Real Hand Illusion on the phenomenology of the bodily self, focusing on 
hand ownership (Q1), location of touch (Q2-3), agency (Q5), and aspects of 
disownership (Q7-Q10). To compare the overall illusion across conditions, a 
combined score was created based on all questions; for this, disownership 
questions were reverse-coded. 
3.1. Study 1 – Limb Disownership 
In study 1, twenty participants completed the synchronous and asynchronous 
feedback conditions and the ten-item questionnaire. As illustrated in Figure 
2, participants rated the seen hand to feel less like their own during the 
illusion (Q1 control: 7.58±3.21 to illusion: 4.46±3.21 (µ±σ), p=.002, 
BF=36.50). Similarly, they reported that it felt less likely that the stroking 
they felt on their hand was due to the stroking on the seen hand (Q2: 
7.06±3.44 to 4.16±3.46, p=.009, BF=10.96), and less likely that it was 
stroked in the same location (Q3: 8.87±1.47 to 3.85±3.51, p<.001, 
BF=2425.24). Questions 4 and 6 are based on control questions from the 
RHI questionnaire but may reflect aspects of limb disownership addressed in 
the current illusion. In study 1, participants did not perceive the shape and 
structure of the hand to differ between conditions (p=.051, BF=2.66), nor did 
they feel that it felt less like looking at their own hand when receiving 
asynchronous feedback (Q6: p=.510, BF=.28). However, participants did 
report an effect of the ReHI on their (hypothetical) ability to move the seen 
hand (“feeling of agency” Q5: 8.81±2.11 to 7.16±3.37, p=.021, BF=5.41). 
With respect to the disownership questions, participants reported that their 
hands felt less vivid than normal during the illusion (Q10: 6.83±2.88 to 
5.15±2.95, p=.016, BF=6.89). Questions Q7-9 were not significantly 
different between conditions in study 1 (all p>.085, all BF inconclusive 
.45<BF<.1.75).  
All questions were combined to calculate an overall illusion score; 
disownership questions were reverse-coded. This led to a possible range of 
scores from 0 to 100, based on the six positively and 4 reverse-coded 
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questions. As hypothesised, participants rated the Real Hand Illusion 
questions significantly more positively in the control condition 
(77.53±13.08) than during the illusion (58.47±17.27, p<.001, BF=292.66) 
designed to induce a loss of ownership.  
3.2. Study 2 – Lateralisation 
In study 2, the lateralization of body representation and its malleability were 
investigated. It was hypothesised that the strength of the illusion would be 
higher for participants’ left hand compared to their right. A 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA, based on the overall illusion strength, confirmed our 
data from study 1 with respect to the main effect of the illusion. The total 
score significantly dropped from 83.95±13.10 during synchronous feedback 
to 66.36±20.06 during the asynchronous feedback of the illusion (main 
effect of illusion F(1,19)=16.04, p<.001, η2=.46). There was no overall effect 
of laterality (p=.107); however, there was a significant interaction between 
the two factors (F(1,19)=4.84, p=.026, η2=.24): Questionnaire scores were 
lower for the left than the right hand during the illusion but not in the control 
condition. As hypothesised, the illusion was stronger for the left hand (paired 
t-test: µ-difference: 6.41±2.69, t(19)=2.38, p=.028) . The ANOVA results 
were corroborated in Bayesian t-tests. The data strongly support a main 
effect of illusion (C>I: BF=92.98) but not of lateralization (R≠L, BF=.78). 
The interaction, indicated by the left-right differences in both conditions, 
was also supported by the data (RI-LI > RC-LC: BF=4.61), resulting from 
the lateralisation difference during the illusion (LI < RI: BF=4.43). 
Inspecting the individual scores for the left hand only (for comparison with 
the study 3) confirmed significant effects on the ‘classical’ ownership 
questions (Q1-Q3) as in study 1 (all p<.013, all BF>7.95). Similarly, as in 
study 1, the ReHI affected the perceived ability to move (Q5: p=.012, 
BF=8.74) and caused the own hand to feel less vivid during the illusion 
(Q10: p=.038, BF=3.33). In addition, participants in study 2 reported that it 
felt less like they were looking at their own hand (Q6: p<.001, BF=744.42) 
but more likely that they were looking at somebody else’s hand (Q7: p=.001, 
BF=53.29). Finally, participants felt more strongly that they could not tell 
where their hand was during the illusion (Q8: p=.005, BF=18.74).  
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3.3. Study 3 – Neurostimulation 
In study 3, we set out to investigate the involvement of right parietal 
networks in maintaining body representation during the Real Hand Illusion. 
In two separate sessions, participants completed the ReHI while receiving 
sham, anodal, or cathodal tDCS stimulation, with the scalp electrode placed 
over the right superior parietal lobe. As this was an exploratory study, we 
were mainly interested in the overall effect of stimulation on ReHI score and 
the main contrast of anodal versus cathodal stimulation. In order to 
normalise the data, we therefore subtracted the average ReHI score during 
sham stimulation from anodal and cathodal scores. This resulted in a 2 x 2 
repeated measures design with factors Illusion (synchronous, asynchronous) 
and Stimulation (anodal, cathodal). In-line with the studies 1 and 2, we 
report a significant main effect of the illusion in a third, independent 
participant pool (F(1,25)=25.54, p<.001, η2=.51, BFC>I=1474.21). We 
additionally observed a main effect of Stimulation with ReHI scores being 
higher during cathodal stimulation than during anodal stimulation 
(F(1,25)=5.35, p=.029, η2=.18, BFC>A=3.81, BFC≠A=1.94, see Figure 3b), 
although there was no interaction between illusion condition and stimulation 
condition (F(1, 25) = 0.02, p = .89). 
Figure 2 illustrates the box-plots for the ReHI score in the sham condition 
(left hand). Akin to both the studies 1 and 2, participants rated ownership 
questions Q1-3 significantly lower during the illusion (all p<.001, all 
BF>77.55). Questions regarding perceived movement (Q5), and 
ownership/disownership questions Q6-9 were scored also significantly lower 
during the ReHI (all p<.025, all BF>4.39). Only Q10, regarding the 
perceived vividness of one’s own hand did not reach significance in this 
condition (p=.077, BF=1.72).  
3.4. Questionnaire Reliability 
As this is a novel illusion accompanied by a newly designed questionnaire, 
we ran a reliability analysis across the three data sets (N=66) – once for the 
control condition, and once for the illusion condition. Cronbach’s alpha for 
the questionnaire responses in the control condition was αcontrol=0.79, in the 
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illusion αillusion=0.85, indicating good internal consistency across the three 
cohorts.   
 
 
 
Figure 3 Effects of Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation on ReHI Strength. A Electrodes were 
placed on the P4 position based of the international 10-20 system and the right shoulder. B The main 
contrast indicates that anodal stimulation over P4 significantly decreased embodiment across both 
conditions compared to cathodal stimulation. (SHAM scores were subtracted for baseline correction.) 
C Breakdown of questionnaire scores across control and ReHI conditions and stimulation type. All 
boxplots indicate medians and Interquartile ranges; means are indicated by solid circles or diamonds 
(CC/CI = Cathodal Control/Illusion; SC/SI = Sham Control/Illusion; AC/AI = Anodal 
Control/Illusion). 
 
4. DISCUSSION  
We here introduce a body-illusion that, for the first time, directly reduces the 
feeling of ownership over one’s biological limb, without relying on feedback 
from a supernumerary proxy such as a rubber hand. Participants view their 
own arm, in Augmented Reality, from an embodied, first person perspective 
but receive feedback that contains a temporal, visuotactile conflict. In a 
series of three studies, in three separate participant pools, we demonstrate 
that the asynchronous feedback in the Real Hand Illusion causes participants 
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to rate ownership (and the sense of agency) over their own hand and related 
sensations significantly lower than in the synchronous control condition. In 
an open feedback, multiple participants independently described the 
phenomenology of the illusion akin to “pins and needles”, the tickling 
sensation that often occurs after transient paraesthesia.  
The Real Hand Illusion, which could be considered as an inverse of the 
classical rubber hand illusion, hence modulates body ownership by 
introducing a controlled mismatch into bottom-up multisensory integration. 
Our data suggest that this weakened embodiment is pronounced for the left 
hand, supporting the right hemispheric dominance hypothesis of body 
representation as reflected in neuropsychological case reports and previous 
ownership illusion studies in healthy participants. Transcranial direct current 
stimulation over the right superior lobule modulated the overall strength of 
limb ownership, corroborating the role of right posterior parietal networks 
for multisensory representations of the body and self.    
4.1. Phenomenology 
Embodiment, ownership, and the sense of agency have been argued to be 
matters of “a very thin phenomenal awareness” (Gallagher, 2007) and to 
only form the “background of mental life” (Longo et al., 2008). Often, we 
only fully become aware of these processes when they break down – which 
can have severe consequences (a collection of accounts are available in 54, 
55). While research into the sense of agency has managed to address this by 
experimentally modulating a loss of control (48–51)(Franck et al., 2001; 
Kannape & Blanke, 2013; Leube et al., 2003; Nielsen, 1963), a symptom 
that is often found in clinical conditions (see e.g. (Blakemore, Wolpert, & 
Frith, 2002)), ownership studies have instead investigated the opposite: a 
‘positive’ ownership of an artificial limb such as a rubber hand or foot 
(Bigna Lenggenhager, Hilti, & Brugger, 2015), or even two versions of 
one’s own hand (Ratcliffe & Newport, 2017) (an interesting conundrum of 
this study is that the ‘fake’ hand is actually based on the participant’s own 
hand, leading to the question of whether one can disown one representation 
of one’s hand over another). Analog to sensorimotor studies delineating the 
spatiotemporal limits of agency, we have here introduced a paradigm to 
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directly induce disownership of one’s own limb: where participants report a 
loss of control over their actions in agency research, participants in the ReHI 
perceive a weakened ownership over their own hand and arm. 
The topic of disownership is a somewhat contentious area with respect to the 
RHI. There is a general consensus that the rubber hand is embodied during 
synchronous feedback (see e.g. (Serino et al., 2013)) – arguably only into the 
body image (for perception) but not the body schema (for action) (M.P.M. 
Kammers, de Vignemont, Verhagen, & Dijkerman, 2009). However, this 
does not imply that one’s own limb is simultaneously disembodied. While 
arguments have been made for disembodiment, either by asking directly 
about disownership of the real hand (Preston, 2013) or by inferring from 
physiological data (drop in skin temperature (G. L. Moseley et al., 2008; 
Salomon, Lim, Pfeiffer, Gassert, & Blanke, 2013) or alterations in immune 
response (Barnsley et al., 2011), but see (de Haan et al., 2017) for a critical 
account) previous studies have relied on including a supernumerary limb, 
and evidence suggests that multiple representations of the hand might co-
exist (H. Henrik Ehrsson, 2009; McGonigle et al., 2002). Ultimately, the 
strongest statement to be made in favour of disembodiment from these 
previous paradigms is that the supernumerary hand replaces or “functionally 
suppresses” the participant’s actual hand (Longo et al., 2008).  
Importantly, the phenomenology of the ReHI extends previous findings as it 
precludes both supernumerary embodiment and the replacement of the actual 
limb representation. There is only one arm. Rather than being indicative of a 
malleability to multisensory body illusions or an ability to incorporate 
supernumerary limbs, the current findings hence suggest that limb 
representation can directly be attenuated, without “tricking the brain” by 
including a proxy. It is therefore not so much illustrating the malleability of 
limb representation but questions its actual permanence: contradicting 
William James famous premise (James, 1890), the body may not always be 
there. 
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4.2. Handedness and Lateralisation  
Study 2 illustrates that the phenomenological experience of the ReHI was 
stronger for the left hand as opposed to the right. This difference in 
lateralisation was specific to the illusion condition as no lateralisation was 
observed in the control condition. The findings are in line with mounting 
evidence that Xenomelia, similar to Somatoparaphrenia, more often than not 
affects the left side of the body (Brugger & Lenggenhager, 2014; McGeoch 
et al., 2011). While an argument is to be made that lateralisation may be a 
result of handedness, and stronger bodily illusions have been reported for the 
non-dominant hand (Brugger & Meier, 2015), evidence from the RHI 
suggests there is a right-hemispheric dominance for sense of body ownership 
independent of handedness ((Ocklenburg et al., 2011), but also see (Smit, 
Kooistra, van der Ham, & Dijkerman, 2017)). Taken together, this suggests 
that the ReHI is mediated by multisensory bodily areas in right-hemispheric 
posterior parietal areas (Hilti et al., 2013; McGeoch et al., 2011; Rode et al., 
1992), further motivating the exploratory neurostimulation study to focus on 
the left upper-limb.  
4.3. Neurostimulation modulates Limb Disownership  
The results from Study 3 indicated that application of tDCS over the right 
SPL modulated the experience of ownership, dependent on the polarity of 
stimulation. Specifically, anodal stimulation led to reduced feelings of 
ownership over the limb, while cathodal stimulation increased feelings of 
ownership. It should be noted that this was an exploratory study, aiming to 
link the ReHI to activity in the parietal cortex; future studies should 
therefore aim to test under which conditions the effect of stimulation holds. 
Our data suggests that stimulation affected the experience of ownership 
during both the illusion and control conditions, suggestive of a broad effect 
of stimulation that is not dependent on synchronous visuotactile feedback. 
Previous studies have shown that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
applied to the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) disrupts the rubber hand 
illusion for body-like objects (but not other objects) (Tsakiris, Costantini, & 
Haggard, 2008). Clinically, low-frequency repetitive TMS applied to the TPJ 
may decrease the frequency of auditory hallucinations in patients with a 
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diagnosis of schizophrenia, a symptom frequently linked to loss of agency or 
ownership over self-generated speech (P. Moseley, Fernyhough, & Ellison, 
2013; Slotema, Blom, van Lutterveld, Hoek, & Sommer, 2014). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that non-invasive neurostimulation is 
capable of affecting the perception of bodily ownership and support the 
therapeutic potential of neurostimulation in disorders of bodily ownership. 
4.4. ReHI Considerations 
In contrast to the on-going, artificially synchronised visuotactile feedback 
required by the RHI, the ReHI relies on exploiting the same bottom-up 
multisensory integration processes by introducing a temporal mismatch to 
disrupt body ownership. In addition to the aforementioned conceptual 
advantages, this has a number of practical advantages. One, the sensation of 
the mismatch is immediate. Unlike the RHI, which relies on continued 
synchronous feedback from two distinct, visuotactile sources and has 
reported onset times between 10-50 seconds (H. H. Ehrsson, 2004; Kalckert 
& Ehrsson, 2017) the ReHI relies on a hard-coded temporal mismatch from a 
single source. Two, the multisensory mismatch is unresolvable, making the 
illusion very stable. Participants feel the touch on the back of their hand 
before receiving visual feedback. As the position of the subsequent touch-
location is unpredictable, there cannot be an adaptation to the conflicting 
sensory information. Three, the mismatch is purely temporal. Whereas 
inadvertent spatiotemporal incongruences occur in both synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions in the RHI, only a single hand is stimulated in the 
ReHI. Four, and continuing this point, the control condition is very accurate, 
as the perceived location of the touch exactly corresponds to the seen 
location. The technical setup precludes an unwanted (spatial) mismatch, 
apart from the intrinsic (temporal) delay. Finally, the setup is portable and 
easily implemented, making it a promising tool for clinical studies and 
potential outpatient treatment. The paradigm relies on a simple (video) 
buffer, making it adaptable to a range of mobile devices and commercially 
available research platforms. 
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4.5. Limitations and Future Directions 
As this is a novel paradigm, there are a number of open questions to address. 
For example, we based our questionnaire on widely used RHI items but 
included four new questions directly addressing limb disownership (Q7-10). 
A follow-up study that investigates an expanded questionnaire using 
principal component analysis, similar to the approach taken by Longo and 
colleagues (Longo et al., 2008) may be able to improve the reporting of the 
phenomenology of the ReHI. Linking back to the “pins and needles” 
sensation reported by participants, physiological reactions to the illusion 
should be investigated following previous protocols on the RHI (body 
temperature (Macauda et al., 2015; G. L. Moseley et al., 2008), nociception 
(Hansel et al., 2011; Romano et al., 2014), cardiac signalling (Park et al., 
2016), response to threat (H. Henrik Ehrsson et al., 2007), and 
immunological responses (Barnsley et al., 2011)) up to high-level cognition 
(Maister et al., 2015)).  
A further line of inquiry should address the clinical aspects of limb 
disownership by working with patient populations. Individuals with 
Xenomelia show an enhanced response for the affected limb in a rubber 
hand illusion type of setup (Bigna Lenggenhager et al., 2015). Does the same 
hold true for the ReHI and how does its phenomenology compare to the 
sensation of “over-completeness” described by these individuals? Does it 
capture aspects of loss of limb ownership experienced in 
Somatoparaphrenia? Applying the ReHI in individuals with Xenomelia may 
recreate the reported feeling of disownership – or, by inducing disownership 
over an unwanted limb – create a cessation in the dysphoric feeling of over-
completeness. Similar to the pretend behaviour exercised by these 
individuals (First, 2005; L. Fischer, 2015), this may offer a temporary relief, 
if not a treatment. Similarly, research with such a cohort will be relevant to 
understanding permanence of body representation. If the loss of ownership is 
a gradual process, it could potentially be tracked longitudinally using the 
ReHI and further related to the frequency and duration of pretend behaviour 
over time. The exploratory tDCS results further merit investigation of 
neurostimulation as a therapeutic possibility (although this may evoke 
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ethical questions pertaining to the identity of individuals with Xenomelia). 
Finally, applying an analogue paradigm to the full body (Blanke, Slater, & 
Serino, 2015) may provide an experimental link to investigating aspects of 
depersonalisation in the general population (Sierra & David, 2011). 
5. CONCLUSION 
The Real Hand Illusion introduced here offers a direct way of modulating 
limb ownership in healthy individuals. It does so without relying on a proxy, 
but by introducing a temporal, visuotactile mismatch into bottom-up 
processed feedback about one’s own limb in Augmented Reality. These 
findings are corroborated by two additional studies in independent 
participant pools linking the illusion to right posterior parietal networks for 
multisensory representations of the body and self. By directly investigating 
the loss of ownership of one’s own limb, analogue to research into the sense 
of agency, the Real Hand Illusion opens up the possibility of more 
adequately addressing the majority of clinical cases of altered body 
ownership; further, it provides a novel method of investigating body 
representation and its permanence in healthy individuals. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 
 
 
Supplemental Figure 1 Visual Feedback during the ReHI. A. Participants viewed an Infra-Red feed of their own hands, 
from a first-person perspective, in an otherwise empty virtual environment (cropped from left eye view). Before either 
condition, participants were provided with real-time feedback and asked to move their hands around the virtual space. B. 
During the control condition (real-time) and the ReHI condition (400ms visual delay), participants received visuo-tactile 
stimulation via a simple paintbrush. Perceiving temporally conflicting information about their own limb, led participants to 
report a loss of ownership of their own limb, compared to the control condition.  
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